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Abstract 
 
Despite the central bank’s crucial position in the economy, as the issuer of the currency and 
the body responsible for monetary policy, its preferences regarding currency 
internationalization and its roles in that process have rarely been analyzed in the literature. 
This study attempts to fill this critical gap by bringing the central bank into the study of 
currency internationalization. A conventional understanding of currency 
internationalization is that it tends to reduce monetary policy autonomy, which implies a 
natural tendency of the central bank to oppose it. This study shows, however, that currency 
internationalization does not necessarily reduce the central bank’s monetary policy 
autonomy, and may in fact even strengthen it. It shows that currency internationalization is 
likely to strengthen the central bank’s independence as well. Based on these findings, this 
study argues that a central bank with weak monetary policy autonomy and low 
independence is more likely to support the internationalization of its country’s currency. 
These arguments are empirically verified, mainly by in-depth analysis of the case of the 
People’s Bank of China and the renminbi.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis (hereafter, the GFC), tensions in the 
international monetary system have intensified—as skepticism over the status of the US 
dollar (hereafter, the dollar) as the dominant international currency has risen, as concerns 
about the sustainability of the euro have increased, and as the internationalization of the 
Chinese renminbi (hereafter, the RMB) shown impressive progress. Reflecting these 
turbulent changes, the political economy research on currency internationalization 
(hereafter, CI) has also grown substantially in recent years.1 Despite this the development 
of political economy theories of CI is still at an early stage, however, and a number of 
salient issues remain to be addressed. 
 The preference of the central bank regarding CI is one such issue. While the preferences 
of private interests, such as financial institutions and non-financial corporations, have been 
examined by a few studies,2 the central bank has rarely been spotlighted in the analysis of 
CI. This lack of concern with the central bank’s preferences is quite surprising given that 
institution’s pivotal position in the monetary and financial system. The central bank is the 
issuer of the currency and is in charge of monetary policy, and therefore also acts as the 
‘lender of last resort’ in a crisis. The central banks in most major countries have in fact 
played leading roles in the recoveries of their economies from the GFC. Moreover, the US 
Federal Reserve (hereafter, usually the Fed) acted as a global lender of last resort during the 
crisis, providing dollar liquidity to foreign economies through currency swaps with them. 
The central bank is thus in a critical position in which it can have considerable influence on 
the internationalization of its country’s currency, by either promoting or hindering it. And 
recent economic history studies (Eichengreen, 2011; Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2012) 
demonstrate that the Fed did in fact play a crucial role in the rise of the dollar as an 
international currency in the early twentieth century. 
 The neglect of the central bank in the study of CI might be attributable to the perception 
of the central bank as a technocratic public agency pursuing public interests. However, the 
central bank is also inherently a political actor—just like any other public agency—that 
wishes to maximize its own institutional interests along with the interests of the public. 
And CI can affect its core institutional interests, such as its monetary policy autonomy and 
independence. The central bank thus does hold particular preferences regarding the 
internationalization of its country’s currency.  
 Against this backdrop, the present study brings the central bank into the study of CI by 
addressing its preferences related to that process, thereby ultimately highlighting the 
salience of domestic politics in it. The preferences of the central bank are analyzed by 
examining, among other things, how CI impacts its two core institutional interests, 
monetary policy autonomy and independence—respectively defined in this paper as the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Bowles and Wang (2008), Chey (2012, 2013, 2015), Cohen (2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 
2015), Cohen and Benney (2014), Germain and Schwartz (2014), Helleiner (2008), Helleiner and Kirshner 
(2009, 2014), Helleiner and Malkin (2012), Johnson (2008), Katada (2008), Kirshner (2008, 2014), Liao and 
McDowell (2015), Ly (2012), McNamara (2008), Norrlof (2014), Otero-Iglesias and Steinberg (2012, 2013) 
and Stokes (2014). 
2 See, for example, Broz (1997), Henning (1994), Helleiner and Malkin (2012) and Katada (2008).    
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economic capacity to run monetary policy effectively, and as political freedom from the 
government in its policy conduct. In this regard, it is of particular note that much research 
on CI tends to point to a decline in domestic monetary policy autonomy as one of the major 
related costs.3 This conventional view implies that, if it is to maximize its institutional 
interests, the central bank will likely oppose CI in order to maintain its monetary policy 
autonomy. However, as will be discussed below in great detail, one of the leading 
advocates of RMB internationalization (hereafter, RMBI) has been the People’s Bank of 
China (hereafter, the PBC),4 China’s central bank, and this poses a puzzle to observers. 
Meanwhile, the literature has seldom examined the impact of CI on the independence of the 
central bank, despite the political and economic significance of this impact, and this 
research offers an analysis of that important issue as well.  
This study finds that, contrary to the conventional understanding, CI does not 
necessarily weaken the central bank’s monetary policy autonomy, but rather tends to lead to 
its growing, especially during the early stages of the life cycle of CI, by inducing a shift to a 
flexible exchange rate system and also by helping to create better conditions for the 
effective operation of price-based monetary policy. This research also illustrates that CI 
tends to enhance the central bank’s independence as well, by increasing foreign pressures 
favoring it and by reinforcing its monetary policy autonomy. Based upon these two 
findings, this study ultimately puts forward its central argument on the preferences of the 
central bank regarding CI: that, all other things being equal, a central bank with weak 
monetary policy autonomy and low independence is more likely to support the 
internationalization of its currency, particularly where it is willing to accept a flexible 
exchange rate. The empirical analysis validating these arguments focuses primarily on the 
case of RMBI and the PBC, given that this case offers a unique opportunity to observe 
closely how the central bank acts in the beginning stages of CI. 
This research makes several significant theoretical and empirical contributions to the 
literature. Theoretically, it expands the list of major domestic political actors seen as 
involved in CI to include the central bank, thereby casting new light on the principal role of 
domestic politics in CI. It also leads us to reconsider the major consequences—in other 
words, the main benefits and costs—of CI, with relation in particular to monetary policy 
autonomy and central bank independence, and provides in addition a new perspective 
explaining why some emerging economies like China seek internationalizations of their 
currencies despite their weak economic and political conditions for it. Empirically, this 
study presents a systematic and comprehensive investigation of why the PBC has so 
actively supported RMBI, based upon close examination including interviews with senior 
PBC officials in the key positions related to RMBI, as well as upon examination of 
documents and papers in the local language.      
 The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the literature 
on CI in general, and also on RMBI in particular, we outline our analytic framework and 
articulate our major arguments. Following this we provide empirical evidence to support 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Broz (1997), Canzoneri et al. (2013), Chinn and Frankel (2007), Dobbs et al. (2009), 
Henning (1994), Kenen (2009) and McNamara (2008). 
4 The abbreviation PBC is the official one used by the People’s Bank of China itself.  
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these arguments, by conducting an in-depth analysis of the Chinese case. We then offer 
conclusions in the final section, discussing the generalizability of our arguments as well as 
our study’s major contributions.  
 
 
LONG NEGLECT OF THE CENTRAL BANK 
 
Most studies of CI analyze practical issues such as the futures of the dollar, the euro, the 
yen and the RMB as international currencies, and generally address two broad theoretical 
themes: CI’s consequences, and its determinants. Studies of the consequences of CI mainly 
analyze the major economic and political benefits and costs of issuing an international 
currency, usually from the perspective of the issuing state.5 The primary benefits consist of 
international seigniorage, increased macroeconomic flexibility, decreased currency 
mismatch problems, growing business gains for domestic financial institutions, and 
strengthening of the country’s international power. The chief costs include constraints on 
monetary policy autonomy, and declines in competitiveness in the export and import-
competing sectors. Additionally, some studies points to market-oriented financial reforms 
as another major consequence of CI, noting that deep and broad financial markets are 
necessary for making a currency more internationally attractive.6 
 Research on the determinants of CI meanwhile strives to identify the economic and 
political factors that affect it at the international and/or domestic levels. The major 
economic factors include the country’s economic size, its shares in world trade and world 
finance, the level of its financial market development, and its monetary and fiscal policies.7 
The political factors encompass its domestic institutions, sectoral interests, international 
power and foreign relations.8 
 These two areas of study—of the consequences of and the determinants of CI—are 
intertwined to some extent, as the consequences of a currency’s internationalization affect 
who will benefit from it and thus support it and who will lose from it and therefore oppose 
it in the issuing country. There is in fact some research that explores the domestic politics 
of CI based upon its domestic distributional effects. Most of this, however, tends to focus 
primarily on the preferences of private interests such as financial institutions and non-
financial corporations.9 Despite the principal position of the central bank in the monetary 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Broz (1997), Cohen (1971, 1998, 2012a, 2015), Dobson and Masson (2009), Eichengreen 
(2011), Genberg (2010), Kenen (2009), Kirshner (1995, 2008), McNamara (2008) and Tavlas (1991). Notably, 
a recent paper on RMBI by Chey (2015) provides a ‘demand-side study’ of CI, by analyzing the benefits and 
the costs of using the RMB from the standpoint of a foreign country using it.  
6 See, for example, Helleiner and Malkin (2012). 
7 See Chinn and Frankel (2007, 2008), Eichengreen and Flandreau (2008, 2012), Helleiner (2008), Kenen 
(2002), Krugman (1984), McNamara (2008), Norrlof (2014), Otero-Iglesias and Steinberg (2012, 2013), 
Stokes (2014) and Tavlas and Ozeki (1992). Given that domestic financial market development is both a 
necessary condition for CI and one of its consequences, there is circular causation between these two issues.   
8 See Broz (1997), Chey (2013), Germain and Schwartz (2014), Helleiner (2008), Helleiner and Malkin 
(2012), Ly (2012), McNamara (2008), Momani (2008), Norrlof (2014), Otero-Iglesias and Steinberg (2013), 
Pittaluga and Seghezza (2012), Posen (2008), Stokes (2014) and Walter (2006). 
9 See, for example, Broz (1997), Helleiner and Malkin (2012), Henning (1994) and Katada (2008). While 
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and financial system, even such domestic research on CI has seldom placed the central 
bank at the center of analysis. 
To be sure, a few studies do deal with the central bank in their analyses of issues related 
to CI. One notable example is the research by C. Randall Henning (1994) on external 
monetary policies of the United States, Germany and Japan. This work examines CI as one 
element of external monetary policies, and treats central bank independence as a key 
independent variable explaining the differences in external monetary policies across the 
case countries. However, in this study central bank independence is neither a factor affected 
by CI nor one influencing central bank preferences regarding it, but a variable affecting the 
degree to which private-sector preferences (mainly over exchange rate policy) are 
translated into actual policy outcomes. Henning’s study also focuses mainly on the negative 
impact of CI on monetary policy autonomy, and as a result has limitations in explaining 
any strong central bank support for CI.10 Meanwhile, J. Lawrence Broz’s (1997) research 
on the origin of the Federal Reserve addresses the Fed’s creation, rather than its own 
preferences relative to dollar internationalization. Some studies such as Walter (2006) point 
to central bank independence as one of the political factors that may affect CI, but they 
hardly investigate the preferences regarding CI of the central bank itself.    
 Recently, the Chinese central bank, the PBC, has attracted some attention from those 
observing the advance of RMBI, as it has been one of RMBI’s main advocates. The central 
goal of a majority of the studies of RMBI has in fact been to assess its feasibility.11 But 
there is some research tackling the Chinese authorities’ motivations for pursuing RMBI, 
which generally points out the major ones as being a reduction in China’s reliance on the 
dollar, the strengthening of its international status and influence, and the acceleration of its 
domestic financial reform.12 And, with particular connection to domestic financial reform, a 
few authors have touched on the PBC’s intentions in supporting RMBI. They usually argue 
that the PBC wishes to achieve capital account liberalization or broader domestic financial 
reform under the guise of RMBI, which has strong nationalistic appeal.13  
 Our analysis in the present paper supports this account of the PBC’s advocacy of RMBI 
to some extent, in that we will also show that the PBC seeks to pursue domestic financial 
reform by promoting RMBI. However, our study goes further than the domestic reform 
argument by complementing its notable shortcomings. Most of those holding this view 
offer only passing comments, rather than providing systematic analyses with solid 
evidence. And more importantly, they fail to explain why the PBC pushes for financial 
                                                 
Broz (1997) stresses the generalizability of private preferences, Helleiner and Malkin (2012) and Henning 
(1994) emphasize their context specificity.        
10 The primary focus of Henning (1994) is actually exchange rate policy, and in particular the value of the 
currency and its stability. 
11 See, for example, Chen and Cheung (2011), Chey (2013, 2015), Cohen (2012b, 2014, 2015), Dobson and 
Masson (2009), Ito (2010), Lee (2014), Subacchi (2013), Subramanian (2011) and Subramanian and Kessler 
(2012). 
12 See, for example, Bowles and Wang (2013), Kirshner (2014), Mallaby and Wethington (2012), Yu (2014) 
and Zhang (2015). Meanwhile, drawing on theories in comparative capitalism, some studies such as McNally 
(2012, 2015) analyze the unique Chinese—or ‘Sino-capitalist’—characteristics of China’s policies for RMBI. 
13 See, for example, Bell and Feng (2013), Davis (2011), Feng (2012), Kroeber (2013), Lo (2013), Thornton 
(2012), Volz (2014), Yu (2014) and Zhang (2015).  
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reform, which actually does not belong among its main responsibilities. In other words, 
they tend to see financial reform per se as the ultimate goal of the PBC, sometimes merely 
noting or assuming that its officials are the most liberal economists in the country.14 In 
contrast to this account, our study stresses that the fundamental goal of the PBC in its 
support of RMBI is to strengthen its own core institutional interests, of monetary policy 
autonomy and independence, rather than to merely achieve financial reform per se, while 
demonstrating how these two goals are connected with each other.       
 
 
CURRENCY INTERNATIONALIZATION AND THE CENTRAL BANK 
 
This section explains the analytic framework of this study, and articulates its major 
arguments.   
 
The analytic framework 
 
Our research does acknowledge, as the literature notes, that in promoting RMBI the 
Chinese authorities may have such policy goals as the lowering of China’s dependence on 
the dollar, the heightening of its international clout and the accelerating of its domestic 
economic reforms, and that the PBC may share these national goals to some extent. It 
however stresses the need for analyzing how CI affects the central bank’s own institutional 
interests, in order to reach a better understanding of its preferences in this regard. For the 
central bank is not an apolitical agency that always pursues the public interest only, but 
inherently a political actor that also holds, just like any other government agency, its own 
institutional interests and seeks to maximize them.15  
With this in mind, this study addresses the impact of CI on the central bank’s two core 
institutional interests among others: monetary policy autonomy and independence. 
Although the impact of CI on monetary policy autonomy has been frequently discussed in 
the literature, its impact on central bank independence has been rarely mentioned. Our 
study thus expands the list of major consequences of CI to encompass central bank 
independence. Further, while the literature tends to discuss the impacts of CI on monetary 
policy autonomy and on domestic financial reform separately, we emphasize their 
connection, and argue that monetary policy autonomy is affected by domestic financial 
reform induced by CI, as well as directly by CI itself.   
 
Monetary policy autonomy 
 
A majority of the studies of CI tend to indicate a decline in monetary policy autonomy as 
the first of its major costs,16 although some of them do also note an increase in 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Jiang (2014). 
15 For general reviews of central banks’ preferences, see Bowles and White (1994), Goodman (1991) and 
Fernandez-Albertos (2015). Maxfield (1997) also analyzes this in the developing country context. 
16 See, for example, Broz (1997), Canzoneri et al. (2013), Chinn and Frankel (2007), Cohen (2012a), Dobbs 
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macroeconomic flexibility as one of its major benefits—which actually complicates the 
understanding of CI’s effect on monetary policy autonomy. In detail, three distinct 
mechanisms through which CI constrains monetary policy autonomy have been pointed to. 
First, the central bank’s ability to control the domestic money supply and interest rates may 
be limited, as foreign holdings of the currency may render the demand for it less stable and 
as the broadened scope for purchases and sales of the currency, by both residents and non-
residents, tends to result in increased capital flows into and from the country. Second, 
where foreign confidence in the currency’s value weakens the central bank may need to 
compromise on its domestic policy goals—by adopting tighter monetary policy than 
otherwise—so as to prevent foreign selling off of the currency. This mechanism is related 
to the so-called Triffin dilemma, that the country issuing the key international currency has 
to supply it to the world, but its unlimited supply will then eventually erode confidence in 
the currency’s value, exposing the country to a risk of foreigners abruptly liquidating or 
reducing their holdings of the currency. Finally, in running its monetary policy, the country 
issuing a consequential international currency is expected to assume greater responsibility 
for management of the overall world economy, rather than pursuing its own domestic 
objectives solely. 
 Such analyses of the negative effects of CI on monetary policy autonomy carry a 
significant implication concerning the central bank’s preferences related to CI: since it is 
expected to hurt monetary policy autonomy, one of its core institutional interests, the 
central bank may be reluctant or opposed to its currency’s internationalization. In fact, a 
good number of studies point to the reluctance of the Japanese and German authorities to 
encourage internationalizations of their currencies in the past, particularly during the 1960s 
through the 1980s, and explain this mainly by citing the aforementioned first or second 
mechanisms constraining monetary policy.17 Much research on RMBI also expresses 
concerns about its negative impacts on the PBC’s monetary policy autonomy through these 
three mechanisms.18 
 In stark contrast to the Japanese and German cases, however, the PBC has been one of 
the most enthusiastic advocates of RMBI in China, as will be examined in detail below. 
And how can we explain this puzzle? In fact, a more rigorous analysis of the effects of CI 
on monetary policy autonomy suggests that the negative impacts are much more limited 
than conventionally thought, and that CI may even strengthen autonomy.    
 To begin with the first mechanism restraining monetary policy autonomy, the limitations 
on it due to foreign holdings of the currency and the increased ease of cross-border capital 
flows, the question of whether CI will actually reduce or increase monetary policy 
autonomy depends primarily on the type of the exchange rate regime. For in a strict sense 
the impact of CI on monetary policy autonomy has more to do with the rise in the degree of 
capital mobility, which tends to increase along with CI, rather than with CI per se (Chinn 
                                                 
et al. (2009), Henning (1994), Kenen (2009) and McNamara (2008). 
17 See, for example, Genberg (2010), Henning (1994), Iwami and Sato (1996) and Tavlas (1991). 
18 See, for example, Chen and Peng (2010), Gao (2010), Hai and Yao (2010), International Monetary Institute 
(2014), Xu and He (2015), Zhang (2015) and Zhang and Tao (2014). 
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and Frankel, 2007; Genberg, 2010; Kenen, 2009).19 Thus, the impact of CI on monetary 
policy autonomy is in essence related to the so-called ‘unholy trinity’, the trilemma that a 
country can simultaneously achieve only two of the three policy objectives of a fixed (or 
stable) exchange rate, capital mobility and monetary policy autonomy.20 Under a fixed 
exchange rate, constraints on monetary policy autonomy due to CI do exist, but they 
disappear or at least decline where a country adopts a flexible exchange rate system, in 
other words where it is willing to endure a decrease in exchange rate stability (Chinn and 
Frankel, 2007; Genberg, 2010; Kenen, 2009).21       
 Japan and Germany in the 1960s and the early 1970s were in fact operating fixed 
exchange rates under the Bretton Woods system. And so their authorities’ worries about 
loss of monetary policy autonomy due to internationalization of their currencies were 
plausible. Although Japan later moved to a floating exchange rate after the collapse of 
Bretton Woods, exchange rate stability, and particularly the avoidance of yen appreciation, 
remained one central concern of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) for quite some time, restraining it 
from supporting yen internationalization (Henning, 1994). But after the 1997 amendment of 
the Bank of Japan Act specified price stability as the BOJ’s primary policy goal, formally 
eliminating its responsibility for exchange rate stability, the BOJ became more supportive 
of yen internationalization, perceiving that it would not constrain its monetary policy 
autonomy under a free floating exchange rate.22 For Germany, after the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods it belonged formally to the European fixed exchange rate systems—the so-
called European ‘snake’, and subsequently the European Monetary System—until launch of 
the common euro currency. Under its commitment to these fixed exchange rate systems the 
Bundesbank remained reluctant concerning internationalization of the German mark, in 
order to avoid weakening its monetary policy autonomy (Henning, 1994).  
 As to the constraints on monetary policy due to concerns about dumping of the currency, 
the second mechanism limiting monetary policy autonomy, this risk is quite real. The 
sterling ‘overhang’ during the decades following World War II, which significantly 
constrained UK monetary policy, is one good example (Cohen, 2015; Eichengreen, 2008, 
2011; Schenk, 2010). This risk persists even under a floating exchange rate, as any sudden 
vast selloff of a currency causes a drastic decline in its value that can seriously disrupt the 
economy. It should be stressed, however, that this risk tends to intensify in the later stages 
of the life cycle of an international currency, when that currency loses its market appeal. In 
the early stages of an international currency’s life cycle—in other words when its 
internationalization is on rise—demand for the currency is growing, and the risk of its 
drastic liquidation is therefore not high (Chey, 2012, 2014; Cohen, 2012a, 2015; Helleiner 
and Malkin 2012). Moreover, in a phenomenon that Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, French 
Minister of Economy and Finance in the 1960s, once criticized as the ‘exorbitant privilege’ 
                                                 
19 In fact, there do not appear to be any significant differences in monetary policy autonomy among the 
United States, the eurozone, the United Kingdom and Japan, even despite the substantial differences in the 
degrees of their currencies’ internationalizations (Papaioannou and Portes, 2008: 70). 
20 This ‘unholy trinity’ is also frequently called the ‘impossible trinity’. 
21 However, monetary policy autonomy in small open economies tends to be limited even under floating 
exchange rate regimes, due to their ‘fear of floating’ (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
22 Author interview with senior BOJ official, November 17, 2014, Tokyo. See also Iwami and Sato (1996). 
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of the United States (Eichengreen, 2011: 4), the state issuing a dominant international 
currency can finance its balance-of-payments deficits by printing its currency, insofar as 
foreigners are willing to hold it. And as a result its capacity to evade the effects of market 
discipline on its monetary policy strengthens when the internationalization of its currency is 
on the rise, meaning an increase in its monetary policy autonomy (Chey, 2012, 2014; 
Cohen, 2012a, 2015; Helleiner and Malkin, 2012). 
 With regard to the burdens of global responsibility on a state issuing a leading 
international currency, the third mechanism constraining monetary policy autonomy, 
history shows that irresponsible leaders are in practice not rare. The United States, for 
instance, has quite frequently not been a responsible issuer of the key international currency 
when its responsibility to the world has conflicted with its domestic priorities. It 
unilaterally abandoned the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and the Latin American debt 
crisis was also triggered by tight Fed monetary policy. The Fed has also adopted an 
extremely loose monetary policy since the GFC, despite strong complaints from emerging 
economies about the resulting huge amounts of capital flowing into them, which have 
increased their risks of financial instability and led them to eventual adoptions of capital 
controls. Although the state issuing a leading international currency is expected to assume 
responsibility for the world economy, this state, which is usually a dominant power during 
its time, does not in practice always fulfill that responsibility.   
 Our analysis has until now focused on the direct effects of CI on monetary policy 
autonomy. CI can however also affect monetary policy autonomy through its impacts on 
the domestic financial system, as it tends to influence a turn of that system in a more liberal 
and market-oriented direction. In detail, it is widely acknowledged that, for substantial 
internationalization of a currency, capital account liberalization is necessary in order to 
increase the convenience of the currency’s use, in other words to reduce the transaction 
costs of that use. Capital account liberalization, in turn, necessitates certain domestic 
financial reforms, and two among others of them have significant connections to monetary 
policy autonomy.  
First, capital account liberalization requires a shift to a flexible exchange rate system, as 
a country adopting a fixed exchange rate regime despite maintenance of an open capital 
account risks speculative capital attacks (Chey, 2012). As discussed above, under the 
‘unholy trinity’ framework, if there is an open capital account in place domestic monetary 
policy autonomy tends to be amplified with the adoption of flexible exchange rates. And a 
drive for CI thus tends to reinforce monetary policy autonomy through facilitating the move 
to a flexible exchange rate system, although this does also mean that the economy must 
compromise and accept increased exchange rate volatility.  
Second, capital account liberalization also tends to promote conditions necessary for 
effective operation of a price-based monetary policy, using interest rates as the primary 
monetary tool as is currently done in most advanced economies. For instance, capital 
account liberalization requires the liberalization of interest rates, a key condition for 
effective price-based monetary policy operation. If a country opens its capital account 
without liberalizing interest rates, this may generate a liquidity crisis as domestic depositors 
will likely move funds from the country to realize better profits (Chey, 2012). Also, the 
deepening and broadening of financial markets induced by CI strengthens the sensitivity of 
10 
 
money balances to interest rates, and as a result boosts the effectiveness of price-based 
monetary policy (Kasman and Rodrigues, 1991; Liao and Tapsoba, 2014).23 The economics 
literature has indeed found empirical evidence suggesting that both the adoption of more 
flexible exchange rates and the liberalization of interest rates have improved monetary 
policy autonomy by enhancing monetary policy transmission (Kasman and Rodrigues, 
1991; Liao and Tapsoba, 2014).               
Whether such financial reforms induced by CI are benefits or costs to the overall 
economy depends upon the specific contexts of the domestic financial system, as Helleiner 
and Malkin (2012) note. A country that wishes to maintain a credit-based, tightly-regulated 
financial system, for instance, is likely to perceive such reforms as costs, and will therefore 
be reluctant concerning CI, as shown in the cases of Japan and Germany in the past 
(Helleiner and Malkin, 2012). Yet, if a country is trying to achieve a consequential degree 
of CI, such financial reforms are generally required. The low degrees of internationalization 
of the yen and German mark compared with that of the dollar are in fact frequently 
attributed to the relative underdevelopment of their financial markets vis-à-vis the deep and 
broad markets in the United States.24  
 To sum up, the argument stressing the negative impacts of CI on monetary policy 
autonomy tends to be oversimplified. Instead, the pursuit of a high level of CI is likely to 
have positive effects on monetary policy autonomy, by leading the economy to adopt a 
flexible exchange rate as well as by helping it to strengthen its conditions for effective 
price-based monetary policy operation. In addition, monetary policy autonomy tends to be 
reinforced during the early stages of the life cycle of CI, since market pressures on 
monetary policy tend to be weaker in those times although they do grow later. All of this 
suggest that, given the long life cycle of an international currency,25 a central bank with 
low monetary policy autonomy will likely support rather than oppose the 
internationalization of its currency, in expectations of the strengthening of its monetary 
policy autonomy and particularly where it is willing to accept a flexible exchange rate.   
  
Central bank independence 
 
Together with its monetary policy autonomy, independence from its government comprises 
another of the central bank’s central institutional interests, as this reduces the government’s 
interference in its policies, including not only monetary policy but also management of its 
financial and human resources, and, going further, strengthens its authority and profile in 
policymaking circles. Central banks do indeed tend to use their resources—such as their 
policy expertise, their information, and their links with financial and business leaders and 
international financial institutions—in order to promote or protect their independence 
(Bowles and White, 1994). 
                                                 
23 The economics literature shows considerable evidence that financial integration helps overall financial 
market development, which Kose et al. (2009) refer to as the ‘collateral benefits’ of financial globalization.  
24 See, for example, Henning (1994). 
25 The internationalization of the dollar began in the early 1910s, and it is still the dominant international 
currency.  
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 In analyzing its consequences, the literature on CI has paid little attention to central bank 
independence. CI is however likely to have positive impacts on central bank independence 
through two channels. First, one of the most fundamental conditions of an international 
currency is the strong confidence of foreign users in that currency’s future value, and this 
tends to require that the central bank be free from domestic political pressures. As 
mentioned above, some studies such as Walter (2006) indicate central bank independence 
to be one of the political factors that may affect CI. And indeed, the issuers of the key 
international currencies in modern history, both the Bank of England and the Fed, did both 
maintain strong political independence when their currencies began to rise internationally, 
although the degrees of their independence also fluctuated thereafter (Meltzer, 2003; Wood, 
2005).  
 CI may also boost the independence of the central bank by promoting its monetary 
policy autonomy. For the independence of a central bank is ultimately affected by its 
performance in carrying out its monetary policy; where a central bank runs a successful 
monetary policy, its authority is likely to grow and its independence to be maintained or 
strengthened. Conversely, where its monetary policy is ineffective a central bank will be 
criticized for policy failure, and its independence may as a result be threatened and its 
authority within policymaking circles decline. And as analyzed earlier, CI is likely to 
improve the conditions for the central bank’s success in monetary policy by strengthening 
its monetary policy autonomy. This will in consequence strengthen its independence as 
well.   
These analyses of the impacts of CI on central bank independence lead us to anticipate 
that a central bank having low independence is likely to prefer internationalization of its 
currency, as a means of helping it achieve its institutional interests. 
 
The central argument 
 
Overall then, consolidating our analyses of the effects of CI on central bank monetary 
policy and independence, we can state our core argument in the present study as follows: 
that, ceteris paribus, where its monetary policy autonomy is constrained and/or its 
independence is low, and where it is also more willing to accept a flexible exchange rate, a 
central bank will be more likely to support the internationalization of its currency in order 
to promote its monetary policy autonomy and/or enhance its independence.  
It should be stressed, however, that this statement does not necessarily mean that central 
banks with high degrees of monetary policy autonomy and independence are likely to 
oppose internationalization of their currencies. A more plausible expectation may be rather 
that such banks will be less interested in promoting it.  
 
 
RENMINBI INTERNATIONALIZATION AND THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA 
 
The present section provides empirical evidence in support of the theoretical arguments 
stated above, with a focus primarily on the case of RMBI and the PBC.  
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The PBC’s push for RMBI 
 
As analyzed by Helleiner and Malkin (2012), there have been few strong domestic private 
interests in China supportive of RMBI, with many rather being opposed to it. Instead, it is 
the PBC that has played the central role in promoting RMBI, through the leading of diverse 
policy initiatives, although the PBC has had to acquire Chinese government approval for 
them due to its status of subordination to the government.  
To start with, the PBC itself first raised the issue of RMBI as a national agenda, even 
before the GFC that became the turning point for a sudden surge of widespread interest in 
RMBI in China (Yu, 2014). The PBC conducted research on the use of RMB in 
neighboring economies in as early as 2005, and one year later published an article (PBC 
Study Group on Renminbi Internationalization, 2006) arguing that the time had come for 
the promotion of RMBI, with an index included for measuring the degree of 
internationalization of a currency. The PBC also persuaded the State Council (China’s 
central cabinet) to approve the offshore issuance of RMB bonds (so-called ‘dim sum 
bonds’), despite resistance from powerful ministries such as the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), which sought to retain its control over the bond markets.  
 After the outbreak of the GFC in 2008, Zhou Xiaochuan, the PBC Governor, published 
in March 2009 a reverberating essay calling for the creation of a supranational reserve 
currency, and implicitly suggested addition of the RMB to the special drawing right 
(SDR)—an international reserve asset created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
with its value based on a basket of major international currencies (currently the dollar, the 
euro, the yen and the British pound)—which would help to enhance RMBI (Zhou, 2009). 
This essay appears to have led the Chinese leadership to endorse the idea of much larger 
international roles for the RMB, as shown by the fact that, one month after its publication, 
the State Council approved a plan suggested by the PBC to permit use of the RMB in cross-
border trade settlement (Davis, 2011). A few months later, in November 2009, the PBC 
established its Monetary Policy Department (hereafter, MPD) II, and put it in charge of 
RMBI and exchange rate policy. 
 Since then the PBC has continued to lead a majority of the policy measures undertaken 
to promote RMBI. These include the establishments of the Renminbi Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (RQFII) program (that allows foreign investors to invest in mainland 
bonds and equities using offshore RMB), of RMB clearing banks in foreign economies, of 
RMB/local currency swaps with foreign central banks, and of a cross-border RMB payment 
system (known as the China International Payment System). The PBC has also opened up 
the Chinese interbank bond market to foreign central banks, international financial 
organizations and sovereign wealth funds, and allowed non-public foreign financial 
institutions as well to raise RMB-denominated debt capital in China’s bond market. 
Moreover, the PBC has strongly supported the plan for developing Shanghai into an 
international financial center by 2020, as well as the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect.   
 Largely owing to these deliberate policies by the PBC, RMBI has made remarkable 
progress in recent years. Approximately one-quarter of both China’s trade and its overseas 
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direct investment are now settled in the RMB.26 According to the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the payment services provider, in 
August 2015 the RMB also became the fourth most popular currency used in cross-border 
payments, even overtaking the yen to trail only the dollar, the euro and the British pound.27     
 The question then is why has the PBC pushed so enthusiastically ahead with RMBI? 
What are the PBC’s interests behind its drive for RMBI? 
 
Enhancement of monetary policy autonomy 
 
It should be stressed that the PBC’s monetary policy autonomy has been significantly 
constrained by certain core elements of the current Chinese monetary and financial system. 
One such element is China’s managed exchange rate regime. To keep the RMB’s exchange 
rate stable at a desirable level even despite the country’s huge current account surpluses, 
the PBC has had to intervene in the foreign exchange market to buy up foreign currency 
with RMB.28 And the PBC’s monetary policy has as a result been significantly paralyzed. 
The bank has faced particular difficulties in raising interest rates, since doing so would put 
additional upward pressures on the exchange rate by attracting capital inflows (Feng, 
2011b: 27; Volz, 2014: 116).  
 The huge accumulation of foreign exchange reserves resulting from the PBC’s foreign 
exchange market interventions has further complicated the problem. The increased reserves 
have caused inflationary pressures in the Chinese economy due to the expanded money 
supply.29 The PBC has worked to absorb excess liquidity—in other words ‘sterilized’ its 
foreign exchange interventions—by issuance of PBC bills, as well as by increasing banks’ 
reserve ratio requirements. And this sterilization policy has generated great costs to the 
PBC, worsening its balance sheet, as the interest rates on PBC bills tend to be higher than 
the rates the PBC receives on its holdings of the US Treasuries accounting for the majority 
of its reserves (Feng, 2011b: 27). Even worse, the PBC has also been subject to the risk of 
massive capital losses on its dollar-denominated reserve holdings in any case of dollar 
depreciation. In April 2011, in fact, on the day when Standard & Poor’s, one of the ‘big 
three’ credit rating agencies, placed a negative outlook on the US government’s debt 
position, Governor Zhou remarked that the amount of China’s reserves was ‘really too 
much’ (Feng, 2011b: 26).  
 In addition, the scale of China’s bond markets is still small, as the volume of Chinese 
government bonds amounts to only about 9.3 percent of M2. This underdevelopment of the 
Chinese bond markets has made it difficult for the PBC to use a price-based monetary 
policy, leading it to rely heavily on quantity-based policies such as reserve ratio 
requirements (International Monetary Institute, 2014: 138). 
                                                 
26 It should be noted, however, that more than one-half of the country’s RMB trade settlement is still done 
with Hong Kong, which is actually a part of China (PBC, 2015). 
27 Its share was still not high, however, amounting to 2.8 percent only.   
28 In the early 2010s the PBC used more than 90 percent of its base money issuance for this purpose (Feng, 
2011b: 27).  
29 In June 2014 the volume of China’s reserves amounted to four trillion dollars. 
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 In this situation the PBC has had strong motivations to try to strengthen its monetary 
policy autonomy, and has expected that RMBI will help it to achieve this goal by leading to 
more market-oriented reforms of the current financial system.30 In detail, in order for 
RMBI to reach a substantial level, capital account liberalization is likely to be needed; and 
to liberalize the capital account without risking massive speculative capital flows and a 
domestic liquidity crisis, shifts to both a more flexible exchange rate and a more liberal 
financial system, particularly interest rate liberalization, should take place beforehand. And 
these two policy changes are critical elements that will reinforce the PBC’s monetary 
policy autonomy.  
Under a more flexible exchange rate regime, the need for PBC intervention in the 
foreign exchange market will decline, which will augment the bank’s monetary policy 
autonomy. Moreover, RMBI fundamentally reduces Chinese reliance on the dollar, a root 
cause of the managed exchange rate system and resulting massive accumulation of dollar 
reserves, and this will also buttress PBC monetary policy autonomy. Meanwhile, the 
liberalization of interest rates will help the PBC to adopt a more price-based monetary 
policy framework, which will boost its monetary policy effectiveness. RMBI also helps the 
Chinese bond markets to develop, in line with the expanded use of RMB financial 
instruments, making it easier for the PBC’s monetary policy to shift from its current 
quantity-based framework to a more price-based one. Governor Zhou has in fact noted that 
the key to improving the effectiveness of China’s monetary policy lies not so much in the 
realm of monetary policy per se, but in wider market-oriented financial reforms including a 
further opening of the Chinese economy (Bell and Feng, 2013: 160-61).  
The PBC has shown firm determination to achieve these policy changes, albeit not 
necessarily at a drastic speed, by calling for and leading them even before RMBI became a 
national agenda. Governor Zhou and his deputies initiated the 2005 exchange rate regime 
reform, which replaced the previous hard peg against the dollar with a managed floating 
system, under which the RMB was managed with reference to a basket of currencies and 
allowed to fluctuate within a narrow band around its daily reference rate (Bell and Feng, 
2013). The upper and lower ranges of the RMB’s daily fluctuations against the dollar were 
initially set at 0.3 percent, but gradually increased up to 2 percent. More recently, in August 
2015, the PBC adopted a more market-oriented method for fixing the RMB reference rate, 
by revising the rate from a moving average of the past ten trading days to the previous 
day’s closing rate in the interbank foreign exchange market, making the exchange rate 
system more flexible. This policy change was viewed by many market observers as driven 
by Chinese determination to get the RMB included in the SDR, which will likely boost 
RMBI.31 And the IMF has in fact called the new system a ‘welcome step, as it should allow 
                                                 
30 Author interview with senior official in MPD II, PBC, Beijing, July 17, 2015. See also Cheng (2014), Ma 
(2011) and Wang (2014). 
31 This system change brought about a 1.9 percentage point devaluation of the RMB, its biggest one-day move 
since 1993, and that was followed by another 1.6 percent decline the following day. There is as a result a view 
that the change was aimed mainly at boosting Chinese exports, through RMB devaluation. However, the gap 
between onshore and offshore RMB exchange rates against the dollar declined dramatically after the change, 
supporting the argument that the main goal was to make the RMB exchange rate more market-sensitive 
(Hughes, 2015).  
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market forces to have a greater role in determining the exchange rate’ (Donnan, 2015) 
while also stating its belief that ‘China can, and should, aim to achieve an effectively 
floating exchange-rate system within two to three years’ (Zhu, 2015). The PBC has 
gradually liberalized interest rates as well. It removed the deposit rate floor and the lending 
rate ceiling in 2004, and then the lending rate floor in 2013. A deposit insurance scheme, a 
precondition for full deposit rate liberalization, was launched in May 2015, and three 
months after that the ceiling on long-term deposit rates was lifted as well.32  
 It should be emphasized that the PBC does indeed perceive the adverse impacts of 
RMBI on its monetary policy autonomy as likely to be minimal.33 And this perception 
seems plausible, given its strong determination to shift toward a more flexible exchange 
rate system that will reduce its policy constraints stemming from the ‘unholy trinity’. The 
PBC also notes that the concentration of the RMB’s international use on real economic 
sectors such as trade and overseas direct investment, which limits the room for speculative 
capital movements, along with the small size of the offshore RMB markets, minimize the 
negative effects of RMBI on its monetary policy autonomy.34 In response to a question 
concerning the possibility of RMBI complicating the PBC’s monetary policy, a senior 
official in MPD II at the PBC stressed that the Fed had paid little attention to the impacts 
on its monetary policy of the dollar’s international uses, and that use of the dollar 
internationally had led to few constraints on Fed monetary policy, before remarking that 
‘the same will be the case for China when the RMB ascends to become an international 
currency’.35  
It is in addition worth noting that RMBI is a politically useful strategy for promoting the 
PBC’s monetary policy autonomy, as it helps to some extent to attenuate domestic 
opposition to the required reforms. In fact, the PBC’s efforts to reform the Chinese 
financial system have frequently been impeded by strong opposition from those having 
vested interests in the Chinese traditional development model, the main pillars of which are 
credit controls and export-led growth, as such reforms imply that model’s abandonment. 
These opponents include the state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises and exporters, 
as well as powerful government bodies that have been responsible for those sectors such as 
the MOF, the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) and the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) (Bell and Feng, 2013). RMBI helps to weaken such domestic 
opposition to the reforms, as to an extent it serves the interests of some of these traditional 
reform opponents. RMBI may for example reduce the exchange risks and operational costs 
of Chinese exporters. And in this regard, many Chinese exporters are in fact willing to offer 
discounts to foreign importers, of around 3 to 5 percent, if they use RMB for trade 
settlement (Chey, 2015: 8). The MOC, which has been responsible for international trade 
and thus preferred reserve accumulation, also appears to have come to favor RMBI recently 
                                                 
32 For more on the history of China’s financial reforms, see Bell and Feng (2013) and Steinberg (2014). 
33 Author interview with senior official in MPD II, PBC, Beijing, July 17, 2015. Recent, as well as earlier, 
reports by PBC officials in its MPD II share this view. See Ma (2011), PBC Research Bureau (2004) and Wu 
and Ning (2014). 
34 Author interview with senior official in MPD II, PBC, Beijing, July 17, 2015. In fact, there are strong signs 
showing a long-term convergence of interest rates across the onshore and offshore RMB markets.  
35 Author interview with senior official in MPD II, PBC, Beijing, July 17, 2015.  
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(Bowles and Wang, 2013: 1377-78). State-owned banks, which have benefited from 
interest rate controls, may also gain from RMBI, since it may expand their business 
opportunities. At the same time, as RMBI has become a national policy goal, perceived 
widely as a ‘Chinese dream’, explicit opposition to it has grown more difficult.36 There has 
in fact been little apparent opposition from the major government bodies to RMBI per se as 
a fundamental objective, although they have expressed differing ideas of how to achieve 
it.37  
 
Strengthening of independence 
 
RMBI also helps the PBC to defend and, going further, strengthen its independence. The 
PBC is not yet an independent central bank. According to the 1995 Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the PBC, which granted it the status of the central bank in the 
national legislation and the mandate to formulate and implement monetary policy and 
financial supervision, the PBC formally operates ‘under the leadership of the State 
Council’. Major policy moves on interest rates and exchange rate policy must be approved 
by the State Council (Bell and Feng, 2013: 9). This having been said, compared with the 
past, when the PBC was a puppet agency of the central state and a mere body for monetary 
policy implementation serving the fiscal needs of the government and state-owned 
businesses, the PBC’s independence—and in particular, its operational independence—has 
grown considerably stronger, especially since the mid-1990s.38 The PBC has successfully 
established itself as a substantial force within Chinese macroeconomic policymaking 
circles, where it plays a key role in shaping policy options and providing advice (Bell and 
Feng, 2013). 
This rise in the PBC’s independence has been attributable largely to the expansion in the 
Chinese leadership’s dependence on the PBC. The PBC’s expertise in modern central 
banking, its institutional capacity in monetary policy, and its establishment of a credible 
policy record have made it indispensable to the central government in the government’s 
efforts to maintain sustainable growth. In other words, the role of the PBC as a ‘problem 
solver’ has helped it to increase its authority within the hierarchy of Chinese policymaking 
(Bell and Feng, 2013; Shih, 2007). Its successful management of monetary policy thus 
directly affects the PBC’s political clout and independence within the Chinese government, 
and PBC officials’ career advancements are also linked to the bank’s institutional 
performance. Any failure by the PBC to operate its monetary policy effectively may lead to 
declines in its authority and influence, and in its independence in turn (Bell and Feng, 2013; 
                                                 
36 Author interview with Liu Dongmin, Deputy Director, Department of International Finance, Institute of 
World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Tokyo, November 17, 2014. 
37 Author interview with senior official in MPD II, PBC, Beijing, July 17, 2015. See also Feng (2011a: 67). 
According to our PBC interviewee, the ‘loudest dissenting’ voices come from some academics in the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, a prestigious Chinese think tank, who stress the need for a neat policy 
sequencing of capital account liberalization and RMBI.    
38 Author interview with senior official in MPD II, PBC, Beijing, July 17, 2015. On the evolution of the 
PBC’s independence, see Bell and Feng (2013) and Chin (2013). 
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Steinberg, 2014). By the same token, any further rise in the PBC’s authority and 
independence will depend largely upon its success in monetary policy management. 
In this situation, due to the constraints on the PBC’s monetary policy there has been 
considerable domestic criticism of the PBC, as incapable of holding domestic inflation and 
asset bubbles in check, and this threatens the bank’s authority within the Chinese 
government. For example, in an unusually scathing remark in late 2011, Luo Jiwei, then 
Chair of China Investment Corporation and incumbent finance minister, blamed the PBC 
for mismanaging China’s monetary affairs by ‘acting like central banks in small 
economies’, which tend to hoard voluminous foreign reserves and retain little monetary 
policy autonomy (Luo, 2011). This criticism brings to mind a similar view among mainland 
economists that, as a large economy, China should seek greater ‘policy space’ through CI, 
or at least currency regionalization, which would improve the central bank’s monetary 
policy autonomy and effectiveness.39 The PBC has also been criticized substantially within 
China for its alleged mismanagement of the nation’s foreign reserves (Bell and Feng, 2013: 
255; Steinberg, 2014).  
Therefore, the strengthening of its monetary policy autonomy through RMBI is directly 
related to the PBC’s independence as well. It is noteworthy in this regard that the 
involvements in exchange rate and foreign reserve policies of other powerful players such 
as the MOF and the NDRC have grown in recent years, as they have encroached on the 
PBC’s authority in these areas (Bell and Feng, 2013: 52, 91; Jiang, 2014: 163). This 
situation may have increased the PBC’s determination to defend its independence through 
RMBI, which is likely to strengthen its monetary policy autonomy.  
RMBI moreover places the Chinese leadership under direct pressure to increase the 
PBC’s independence, as the international community is aware that under government 
control of the monetary authority there is a critical potential risk of monetary policy 
exploitation for the government’s own political goals. Indeed, many foreign and domestic 
observers have called for strengthening of the PBC’s independence to ensure successful 
RMBI, emphasizing the need to improve the credibility of China’s economic and legal 
systems.40 And in fact, according to some insiders in Chinese policy circles, top leaders 
have considered granting the PBC formal independence, which would make it the first 
government agency in Chinese history to have been awarded autonomy from the 
government (Feng, 2013: 50). 
To be sure, the PBC does not itself expect to achieve full independence from the 
government, owing in part to its broad policy responsibilities, which go beyond monetary 
policy and require it to work together with other government agencies, as well as to its 
weak manpower.41 Nonetheless, it does regard monetary policy independence as ‘what it 
could obtain in reality’.42    
 
                                                 
39 See, for example, Zhang (2014) and Li (2011). 
40 See, for example, Eichengreen and Kawai (2014) and Huang, Wang and Fan (2014). 
41 Author interview with senior official in MPD II, PBC, Beijing, July 17, 2015. For example, the PBC is also 
responsible for development of the Chinese credit information and credit ratings systems.   
42 Author interview with senior official in MPD II, PBC, Beijing, July 17, 2015. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the crucial position of the central bank in the economy, the literature has paid little 
attention to that institution’s role in the process of CI. This study has attempted to fill this 
critical gap by analyzing the preferences of the central bank regarding CI. In contrast to the 
conventional emphasis on the negative impacts of CI on domestic monetary policy, we find 
that CI is in fact likely to strengthen the central bank’s monetary policy autonomy, 
especially in its early stages. It can in addition be expected to promote central bank 
independence from its government. A central bank with low monetary policy autonomy and 
independence, and with a willingness as well to accept a flexible exchange rate, is thus 
more likely to support CI, which it can use as an effective means for strengthening them. 
Our analysis of the PBC and RMBI has strongly supported these arguments.  
 Are these arguments generalizable, going beyond the Chinese case? Although systematic 
testing against a large number of other cases is outside the scope of this paper, we provide 
now a preliminary discussion in this regard by briefly addressing the cases of the major 
international currencies in modern history. Firstly, the cases of the British pound in the 
nineteenth century and the dollar in the early twentieth century—that is, when those 
currencies rose as leading international currencies—do not challenge our arguments, as 
their situations were not comparable with that of today’s RMB. In those times the issuing 
countries had adopted the gold standard, under which the primary monetary policy goals of 
their central banks were to maintain the gold parities of their currencies, with domestic 
monetary policy autonomy in the contemporary sense seldom a major central bank concern 
(Eichengreen, 2008). Secondly, the cases of Japan and Germany during the 1960s to the 
1980s, when they were reluctant to promote internationalizations of the yen and the 
German mark, do not challenge our arguments either. As discussed previously, those two 
countries operated fixed exchange rates under Bretton Woods, and even after that system’s 
collapse remained reluctant to accept free floating, putting great emphasis on exchange rate 
stability instead. Moreover, the independence of the Bundesbank is well known. And while 
the BOJ’s independence at that time is in contrast often perceived to have not been high, 
there are studies that argue the opposite.43      
Thirdly, the more recent cases of the BOJ, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
Federal Reserve, all of which are generally assessed as having relatively decent monetary 
policy autonomy and independence, appear to be in line with our argument that such central 
banks are unlikely to be eager to promote internationalizations of their currencies. Although 
the BOJ has not been opposed to internationalization of the yen any longer since the late 
1990s, when it became more willing to tolerate free floating, its support for yen 
internationalization has been lukewarm, in contrast to the case of the PBC. The ECB, 
meanwhile, has since its inauguration in 1998 taken a quite neutral position toward 
internationalization of the euro. And the Fed has not expressed any significant concerns 
about the dollar’s leading international currency status, even despite its extremely loose 
monetary policies since the GFC, which have been widely indicated as likely, in the long 
                                                 
43 See, for example, Parkin (1986).  
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run at least, to significantly tarnish the dollar’s international status.44 Finally, the cases of 
other emerging economies appear to offer more direct support for our central argument. In 
addition to China, some other emerging economies such as India and Russia aspire to 
internationalize their currencies, and they tend to have central banks with weak monetary 
policy effectiveness and/or low independence.45 This rudimentary observation of other 
countries’ cases suggests that the generalizability of our arguments is likely high, and it will 
thus be worth testing them in a more systematic manner in future studies.    
 We conclude by highlighting the major contributions of this study to the literature. First 
of all, this research calls attention to the need to factor in the central bank in the study of 
CI, as a primary political actor that can affect the political dynamics surrounding CI. To our 
knowledge this is one of the first studies providing a systematic political economy analysis 
of this subject, and it can thus be expected to lay a significant foundation for future study. 
Related to this first point, the present study therefore ultimately stresses the importance of 
domestic politics in CI, in contrast to the majority of the studies of CI, which have been led 
mainly by economists and have as a result focused mainly on the domestic economic 
conditions of the issuing states. Although there are a few political economy studies 
addressing the domestic politics of CI, their number is still small, and further development 
of analysis of the domestic politics involved is certainly needed.  
 This study leads us to reconsider the consequences—the benefits and costs—of CI as 
well. In particular, it newly highlights the positive impacts of CI on monetary policy 
autonomy—both its direct ones, and its indirect ones through facilitation of domestic 
financial reform—as well as on central bank independence. In addition, the analysis in this 
research shows that a consequential degree of CI is likely to ultimately require a shift of the 
economy to a more liberal and market-oriented system. Whether this will benefit or hurt the 
economy depends largely on political economic specificities in the individual countries 
concerned. Those that are unwilling to bear the costs are reluctant to actively pursue 
internationalizations of their currencies, as shown in the cases of Japan and Germany in the 
past. The PBC is in contrast determined to undertake market-oriented reform. But how the 
PBC preference will be received in the Chinese policymaking process will ultimately be 
affected by the broad domestic politics surrounding RMBI, encompassing other 
government institutions and private interests. This issue is beyond the scope of the present 
study, but the growing, albeit gradual, liberalization of the Chinese financial system over 
the past decade, and the recent drastic advance in RMBI, may imply a consensus between 
Chinese leaders and the PBC, on the future policy direction at least, if not necessarily on 
the speed of the requisite reforms associated with it.                 
Going beyond mere nationalistic accounts, this study also opens a new way of 
understanding why some emerging economies engage in the daunting task of 
                                                 
44 The Annual Reports between 2008 and 2014 of the Federal Reserve Board—which contain the bi-annual 
Monetary Policy Reports and the minutes of all Federal Open Market Committee meetings during the year—
have rarely mentioned the dollar’s international roles, which implies that the issue did not enter significantly 
into the Fed’s deliberations during this period.  
45 The independence of the Reserve Bank of India remains at the lowest level in the world (Dincer and 
Eichengreen, 2014). Meanwhile, the monetary policy of the Central Bank of Russia has been substantially 
criticized in that country in recent years (Johnson, 2013).  
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internationalizing their currencies, even though their economic and political conditions 
have usually not reached the levels required for successful CI. In fact, in contrast to the 
cases of the past emergences of the British pound and the dollar as the leading international 
currencies, which were strongly backed by those countries’ powerful financial interests 
(Broz, 1997; Eichengreen, 2011), the support of CI from domestic private interests in 
emerging economies tends not to be strong.46 The findings in this paper offer an account of 
why some of those countries nonetheless pursue internationalization of their currencies, 
which requires considerable expenditures from their only limited resources. Lastly, 
although by no means least importantly, this study offers an in-depth empirical analysis of 
the PBC’s motives behind its vigorous support for RMBI, by illustrating how it actually 
perceives the expected impacts of RMBI on its monetary policy autonomy and 
independence.  
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